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Whether the district court properly dismissed all of Appellants Craig and Serena Watson 
(the "Watsons") claims against all Defendants-Respondents for failure to state a claim pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 2(b )( 6). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE 
The Watsons brought this lawsuit in an attempt to prevent non-judicial foreclosure of 
their home. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Allegations Of The Amended Complaint 
The Watsons filed their complaint on August 7, 2014 in the Kootenai County District 
Court. (Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R. ") R.16). The Watsons filed an amended complaint (the 
"Amended Complaint") on August 25, 2014. (R.49). At the time the Amended Complaint was 
filed, the Watsons were represented by Henry D. Madsen of Madsen Law Offices, P.C. (See 
R.56). 
The Amended Complaint named Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America") 
Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. ("Greenpoint"), ReconTrust Company, N.A. ("Recontrust"), 
Green Tree Servicing LLC ("Green Tree") 1, Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie 
1 As a result of a merger that occurred after this lawsuit was filed, Green Tree Servicing LLC is 
now known as Di tech Financial LLC. To avoid confusion, this brief will use the term "Green 
Tree." 
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Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), Mortgage Funding Inc., 
North Idaho Title, and Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. as defendants. 
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Watsons purchased a home in Coeur d'Alene, 
Idaho with a loan from Greenpoint that was memorialized in an executed note ("Note") and deed 
of trust ("Deed of Trust"). (See R.51 at ,1,114-15; R.52 at ,119). In May 2010, the Watsons 
applied for and received a loan modification from Bank of America ("Loan Modification 
Agreement"). (R.52-53 at ,1,123-30). The Watsons signed the Loan Modification Agreement and 
returned it to Bank of America. (R.52 at i!25). 
The Watsons allege in the Amended Complaint that, at some unspecified point in time, 
they requested a copy of the Loan Modification Agreement with the signature of the "Lender," 
but do not specify which entity they believe should have signed the Loan Modification 
Agreement. (R.52-53 at i!i!28-29). The Watsons claim that they "began receiving statements 
from [Bank of America] but said statements did not credit them for the payments they were 
making." (R.53 at i!30). Over three years after the Loan Modification Agreement, a "Notice of 
Default declaring that the Watsons were in breach of the terms and conditions of the obligation 
secured by the Deed of Trust ... was recorded on or about November 5, 2013 .... " (R.53 at i!35). 
The Amended Complaint makes a number of vague allegations that suggest several 
different causes of action. For example, the Watsons allege: 
That pursuant to the original Note and Deed of Trust and the Loan Modification 
Agreement, Plaintiffs performed by making the required payments to Defendant 
however, Defendant failed to credit Plaintiffs with said payments; failed to 
provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the signed Loan Modification Agreement in 
breach of said Note, Deed of Trust and Loan Modification, and have acted in 
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ways which are unconscionable in violation of the Statute Frauds, Uniform 
Commercial and the Idaho Credit Code. 
(R.53 at iJ39). The Amended Complaint also alleges that: 
Further Plaintiffs have detrimentally relied upon the Loan Modification 
Agreement and the promises of Defendants and if Plaintiffs are no [sic] 
reimbursed all proceeds paid toward said agreements, they will be damaged and 
Defendants will be unjustly enriched as a result of said breach and unconscionable 
conduct in an amount to be proven at trial in this matter. 
(R.54 at iJ40). In the prayer for relief, the Amended Complaint seeks relief under various statutes 
and lists causes of action, but none of these alleged claims have the necessary supporting 
allegations. For example, the Watsons seek "judgment against Defendants for damages and 
declaratory relief for violation of the notice requirements ofldaho Code§§ 45-1505 and 45-1506 
in an amount as may be proven at trial ands [sic] declaring the non-judicial foreclosure 
invalid .... " (R.55 at iJ7). However, the Watsons make no other allegations concerning any 
deficiency of any notice. The prayer also states a claim for breach of contract against 
"Defendants" without specifying which contract was breached by which defendant. Similarly 
the Watsons pray for a judgment "against Defendants for violations of the Statute of Frauds, the 
Uniform Commercial Code, and the Idaho Credit Code," but fail to specify which specific 
defendant violated any specific provision of those statutes. (R.55). 
Other than identifying MERS, Green Tree, and Fannie Mae as parties (see R.50 at ,r,r4-6), 
there are only a handful of other allegations concerning these entities. The only substantive 
allegation concerning MERS is the statement that pursuant to the Deed of Trust, MERS "was 
acting solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns and as such was the 
beneficiary under the Deed of Trust." (R.52 at ,r21 ). Regarding Green Tree, the Amended 
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time the Complaint chain 
shows that Green Tree Servicing is the holder of the promissory note and the deed of trust." 
(R.53 at if32). The Amended Complaint also alleges that "Bank of America, and/or Green Tree 
and or Fannie Mae by and through its predecessor(s) in interested (hereinafter "LENDER"), were 
all claiming to the be the beneficiary of said Deed of Trust and Note." (R.53 at if33) .. This is 
also the only substantive allegation concerning Fannie Mae. 
B. The Motion To Dismiss 
On June 1, 2015, Defendants Bank of America, Greenpoint, and ReconTrust filed a 
motion to dismiss (the "Motion to Dismiss"). (R.239-40). In the Motion to Dismiss, the moving 
defendants argued that any claim for breach of contract was insufficiently pled. (R.250-52). The 
Motion to Dismiss also explained that all defendants had complied with Idaho foreclosure law 
because "the recorded documents show that Green Tree met the statutory requirements to initiate 
foreclosure." (R.252-53). More specifically, the recorded documents in the Kootenai County 
Recorder's office demonstrate that all transfers of the Deed of Trust that occurred prior to the 
date of the foreclosure sale were recorded. (R.253). 
The Motion to Dismiss explained that any claim asserted against Bank of America for 
failing to credit the Watsons for payments failed because any payments were made pursuant to 
the Watsons' contractual obligation to repay the loan and thus, cannot constitute unjust 
enrichment. (R.253-55). Similarly, the Motion to Dismiss argued that any claim for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed as a matter of law because the Watsons 
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not alleged specific tem1 of the Note, Deed of Trust, or Loan Modification 
that was purportedly breached. (R.255). 
Although the Amended Complaint did not make any specific claim concernmg 
defendants' standing to initiate foreclosure, the Motion to Dismiss also explained that "the 
foreclosing entity does not need to prove ownership of the Note in order to foreclose and there is 
a complete record of recorded documents giving Green Tree standing to foreclose." (R.256). 
On June 15, 2015, Green Tree filed an answer and asserted an affirmative defense of 
failure to state any claim for relief. (R.271 & R.274). MERS and Fannie Mae never filed a 
responsive pleading. 
On July 1, 2015, the Watsons filed a Reply and Objection to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (the "Objection"). (R.295). The Watsons were still represented by counsel when they 
filed their Objection. (See R.295). In the Objection, the Watsons claimed: 
Defendants' Motion to dismiss essentially is that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
is not specific enough about the allegations concerning Defendants [sic] handling 
of Plaintiffs loan. That is what the discovery process is for. At this point, 
Defendants are the ones with the particular, specific, knowledge as to what they 
did in the handling of Plaintiffs [sic] loan. 
(R.318). Although not part of record on appeal, the district court granted Henry Madsen of 
Madsen Law Office's motion to withdraw as counsel on July 6, 2015.2 On August 19, 2015, 
Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. filed a joinder to the Motion to Dismiss. (R.327). 
2 The fact that counsel for the Watsons withdrew after filing the Objection to the Motion to 
Dismiss, but before the hearing, should not affect this Court's analysis because "Prose litigants 
are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Golay v. Loomis, 
118 Idaho 387,392 (1990) (quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 1089 n.5 
(1987)). 
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the September 2015 hearing, Honorable Haynes granted the Motion 
to Dismiss because "the Court finds that the complaint and the amended complaint when read in 
its totality failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted." (Transcript on Appeal 
("Tr._") at Tr. 25:7-11). Although the district court granted the moving defendants' request for 
judicial notice (Tr.11 :2-12), in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the district court stated it 
"analyzed this purely on the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs in their complaint and amended 
complaint." (Tr.28:9-11). More specifically, the district court stated: 
I'm granting the motion to dismiss by saying there were insufficient pleadings on 
which these corporate parties needed to defend themselves. They just weren't 
sufficiently plead. I could not have granted any relief on the state of the 
complaint because it was just insufficiently plead. 
We didn't even get to the merits of the facts. And that's why it seems like I just 
ignored your factual assertions here today, and in a sense I did, but that's because 
were not even getting to the facts of the case, the complaint was insufficient to get 
to that stage of the case where we analyze the facts. 
(Tr. 30: 16-31 :2). 
On September 11, 2015, the district court executed an Order on the Motion to Dismiss 
that stated "Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants." 
(R.333). 
ARGUMENT 
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"This Court reviews de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint under Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Brooksby v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546, 547 (2012). 
After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party, this 
Court then looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated. 
- 6 -
V. of Ketchum, 137 1 issue is not plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. 
( quotations omitted). 
Applying these familiar standards, this Court should affirm the district court's decision in 
all respects: 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED ALL CLAIMS PURSUANT 
TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B){6) 
A. The District Court Properlv Dismissed All Defendants 
The district court properly dismissed the Watsons' Amended Complaint against all 
defendants to the action because the Watsons simply failed to state any cause of action against 
any defendant. 
At the time of the hearing, all counsel for defendants believed that the district court 
intended to dismiss all claims against all defendants. MERS, Green Tree, and Fannie Mae 
believe this interpretation is fairly supported by the hearing transcript. (See Tr. 25:7-11& 30:16-
31 :2). However, to the extent the Court believes the transcript is not clear as to this issue, it 
should not affect the Court's analysis because the Watsons did not object to the order on the 
Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Watsons are precluded from challenging the order and have 
waived any issue as to whether the order should apply to Green Tree, MERS or Fannie Mae. See 
McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 958 (2008) (pro se plaintiff failed to preserve argument that 
court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss case sua sponte because plaintiff failed to raise issue in prior 
proceedings before the Court of Appeals); see also Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866 
(2009) ("A party's failure to object to action by the trial court precludes a party from challenging 
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that action on appeal"); Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 452 (1996) (Idaho Supreme Court 
will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal). 
Even if the Watsons had preserved the issue for appeal by objecting in district court, they 
have not raised the issue in their opening brief, which also results in waiver of the argument. 
Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, 152 Idaho 519, 525 (2012) ("Rule 35(a)(4), LA.R., 
provides that an appellant's failure to include in his initial appellate brief a fair statement of an 
issue presented for review results in waiver of the issue"). 
B. The Amended Complaint Does Not Contain Sufficient AIJegations Against 
MERS, Green Tree, or Fannie Mae 
The Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to support any 
claim for relief against MERS, Green Tree, or Fannie Mae. 
Concerning MERS, the only substantive allegation is the single statement that pursuant to 
the Deed of Trust, MERS "was acting solely as nominee for lender and Lender's successors and 
assigns and as such was the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust." (R.52 at i]21 ). That allegation 
is not enough to support any claim for relief. Indeed, "having MERS the named beneficiary as 
nominee for the Lender conforms to the requirements of a deed of trust under Idaho law." 
Edwards v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 154 Idaho 511,517 (2013). Without 
any other allegations concerning MERS, the Amended Complaint fails to state any cause of 
action against MERS. 
Regarding Green Tree, the Amended Complaint alleges that "At the time of the filing of 
this Complaint the recorded chain of title shows that Green Tree Servicing is the holder of the 
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note and the of trust. at The Amended Complaint also states that, 
at unspecified points in time, "Bank of America, and/or Green Tree and or Fannie Mae by and 
through its predecessor(s) in interested (hereinafter "LENDER"), were all claiming to the be the 
beneficiary of said Deed of Trust and Note." (R.53 at 133). This is also the only substantive 
allegation concerning Fannie Mae. Similar to the allegations concerning MERS, these 
allegations are not sufficient to state any cause of action against Green Tree or Fannie Mae. The 
simple allegation that Green Tree "or" Fannie Mae claimed to be "the beneficiary of said Deed 
of Trust and Note" cannot support any contractual or tort claim. Nor does it provide any grounds 
to contest the nonjudicial foreclosure. 
Concerning the allegation that Bank of America breached the Loan Modification 
Agreement, the district court properly dismissed this claim because the Watsons' allegations 
concerning their payments after the Loan Modification Agreement are intentionally vague. The 
Watsons allege they "continued to make their payments as agreed" after signing the Loan 
Modification Agreement on July 1, 2010. (R.52 at 1125 & 27). The Watsons also allege that 
"Plaintiffs performed by making the required payments to Defendant however, Defendant failed 
to credit Plaintiffs with said payments; failed to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the signed Loan 
Modification Agreement in breach of said Note, Deed of Trust and Loan Modification, and have 
acted in ways which are unconscionable in violation of the Statute of Frauds, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and the Idaho Credit Code." (R.53-54 at 139) ( emphasis added). 
The implication of these allegations is that the Watsons made some payments after the 
Loan Modification Agreement, but stopped after a dispute with Bank of America concerning 
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Watsons' account was allegation the Watsons need to make (but 
in order to contest the foreclosure or state a breach of contract claim is that they made all 
required payments on their Loan after the Loan Modification Agreement was executed in 2010 
until the Notice of Default was recorded over three years later in 2013. Without that allegation, 
the district court properly dismissed the contract claim because there is "no pleading that 
essentially outlines that plaintiffs had performed under the loan modification agreement but there 
was simply that they had not been credited for payments, but certainly no concise statement of 
how they had performed under that contract." (Tr. 26:14-19). Accordingly, the district court 
was correct in dismissing the contract claim. 3 
The remainder of the Watsons allegations are too vague and conclusory to support any 
cause of action. The Watsons make the following allegation: 
That it is of information and belief that there is a defect in the assignments in the 
chain of title leading up to said Notice of Default which cuased [sic] a disruption 
in the chain of title making the Notice of Default and Notice of Sheriff's Sale 
invalid and beyond the statute of limitations for foreclosing upon said Note and 
Deed of Trust. 
(R.53 at ,I37). The Watsons fail to provide any specifics regarding the alleged "defect" or 
"disruption." Further, the alleged "defect" is merely a legal conclusion, not an factual allegation 
required to support a cause of action. See, e.g., Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 
3 On April 11, 2016, the Watsons filed a "Citing of Additional Authorities." In that document 
the Watsons contend that the Supreme Court of Montana's decision in Morrow v. Bank of Am., 
NA., 2014 MT 117 (Mont. 2014) is relevant to the issue of Bank of America's handling of the 
Loan Modification Agreement. However, that appeal reviewed the trial court's award of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at Pl. Similar to the Watsons' Objection and 
their Appellant's Brief, Morrow does not provide any guidance as to how the allegations in the 
Amended Complaint state any cause of action. 
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136 order to survive a 12(b )( 6) motion to dismiss, it 1s not a 
complaint to make conclusory allegations). 
In the prayer for relief, the Watsons seek "judgment against Defendants for damages and 
declaratory relief for violation of the notice requirements ofldaho Code § § 45-15 05 and 45-1506 
in an amount as may be proven at trial ands [sic] declaring the non-judicial foreclosure 
invalid .... " (R.55). However, the Watsons make no other allegations concerning the deficiency 
of any notice. Instead, the Watsons only allege that a notice of default was recorded on or about 
November 5, 2013. (See R.53 at ,r35). 
Although the Watsons do state that whether the district court erred in dismissing their 
claims under 12(b )(6) is an issue in this appeal (Appellant's Brief at p. 8), the Watsons never 
provide any coherent explanation of why the district court erred in ruling that the Watsons had 
failed to state any cause of action based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint. See IRCP 
8(a)(l) (requirement that a complaint contain a "a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief'). 
The Watsons also complain that the district court incorrectly stated that the Watsons did 
not file any objection to the Motion to Dismiss. The Watsons selectively quote the hearing 
transcript in support of this argument. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 8-9). However, the full quote 
from Judge Haynes demonstrates that the Court had received and reviewed the Objection. 
Now, what the court has heard today, and the record should reflect that the 
Watsons did not file any memorandum of objection to the motion to dismiss. 
They did they did, I guess object to the motion and indicated that properly that 
Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion looks only to the pleadings. 
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acknowledged that Objection, the 
Watsons never explained in their objection how the Amended Complaint satisfied the pleadings 
standards. (See also Tr.12:9-25 ( counsel for Bank of America, Greenpoint and Recontrust 
discusses the Objection at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss)). 
In sum, the district court properly dismissed the Amended Complaint for failure to state a 
claim. 
V. THEW A TSO NS' NEW ARGUMENTS HA VE NO MERIT 
A. MERS Is a Proper Beneficiarv Under Idaho Law 
The Watsons argue that any assignment from MERS is void. (Appellant's Brief at p. 19). 
As an initial matter, this argument was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, nor was this 
argument raised in response to the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, it cannot be considered now 
for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Total Success Jnvs., LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist. (In 
re Encroachments), 148 Idaho 688,692 (2010) (issue not preserved for appeal when argument is 
not raised in response to a motion to dismiss). 
Even if the Watsons had preserved this issue for appeal, and even if the Watsons can 
challenge the alleged "void ab inito" assignment now, their argument is squarely contradicted by 
Idaho law. Although it is far from clear which specific transfer the Watsons are now 
complaining about, it appears they believe that the December 3, 2010 assignment of the Deed of 
Trust from MERS (as nominee of the lender and its successors and assigns) to Bank of America 
was somehow invalid. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 19 ( citing the assignment of deed of trust at 
R.65)). 
- 12 -
whether MERS can serve as the named beneficiary as nominee the lender 
and assign a deed of trust has been decided by this Court in Edwards v. j\;fortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, 154 Idaho 511 (2013). In Edwards, the plaintiff claimed that MERS could 
not be the beneficiary unless it has an interest in the note that is secured by the deed of trust. Id. 
at 514. Even though "[t]he deed of trust was not given for the benefit of MERS or to secure an 
obligation owing to MERS," this Court held the lender had the authority to designate an agent to 
act on its behalf, and the actions of its agents were equivalent to the actions of the lender. Id. at 
516-17 ("Designating MERS as the beneficiary in its representative capacity as nominee of [the 
lender] and its successors and assigns was legally no different from designating [the lender] and 
its successors and assigns as the beneficiary"). Therefore, "having MERS the named 
beneficiary as nominee for the lender conforms to the requirements of a deed of trust under 
Idaho law." Id. at 517 ( emphasis added). 
Under Edwards, MERS is permitted to assign a deed of trust and record that assignment 
even though MERS never owned an interest in the underlying Note because: 
Designating MERS as the beneficiary in its representative capacity as nominee of 
Lehman Brothers and its successors and assigns was legally no different from 
designating Lehman Brothers and its successors and assigns as the beneficiary. 
"Pursuant to the grant of authority by the principal, the agent is the representative 
of the principal and acts for, in the place of, and instead of, the principal." 3 Am. 
Jur. 2d Agency§ 1 (2002). 
Edwards, 154 Idaho at 517; see also Rencher v. Recontrust Co., NA., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
153989, *8 (D. Idaho November 12, 2015) ("Unfortunately for Plaintiff, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that MERS has the authority to assign a deed of trust, and record that assignment, 
even though it lacked an interest in the underlying note" (citing Edwards)). 
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In support of the Watsons cite to In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. (Bankr. D. 
Idaho 2009). In re Wilhelm held that assignments of a deed of trust where MERS "purports to 
assign to Movant the relevant deed of trust 'together with' the corresponding secured promissory 
note" was insufficient evidence in bankruptcy court to establish ownership of the note when the 
declarations submitted in connection with motions for relief from an automatic stay failed to 
establish that MERS was authorized to transfer the promissory notes. Id. at 397 & 404. This 
Court has already ruled that In re Wilhelm is inapplicable in the context of nonjudicial 
foreclosure. Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 847 n.3 (2012) (expressly 
stating that In re Wilhelm is "inapplicable in the context of nonjudicial foreclosure"). 
The Watsons also appear to suggest that the December 3, 2010 assignment of the Deed of 
Trust from MERS to Bank of America is invalid because that assignment purports to assign the 
Note in addition to the Deed of Trust. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 19 ( citing the assignment of 
deed of trust at R.65)). The Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations concerning 
assignments of the Note other than the insufficient, conclusory allegation that some unspecified 
"defect" may have occurred. (R.53 at iJ37). The Watsons cite to Bank of New York v. 
Silverberg, 86 A.D. 3d 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) in support of this new argument. That case 
held that under New York law, MERS lacked authority to assign an interest in the note as agent 
of the lender because "MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes .... " Id. at 
283. 
Promissory notes are negotiable instruments governed by contract law and Articles 3 and 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Promissory notes are transferred via endorsement and 
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the not from Code§§ 28-3-101 to 
605; Idaho Code § § 28-9-101 to 28-9-628. MERS does not contest that it never held the Note or 
that the reference to the Note in the December 3, 2010 transfer of the Deed of Trust was a 
scrivener's error. The surplus language does not invalidate the assignment. See In re Lopez, 446 
B.R. 12, 19 n.34 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) ("Although the Assignment contains language 
purporting to assign both the Note and Mortgage, MERS lacked an assignable interest in the 
Note. While this surplusage evidences poor drafting, it does not affect the validity of MERS's 
assignment of the Mortgage"). In addition, there is no requirement that transfers of a promissory 
note be recorded. See Deckys v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86586, 
*33 (D. Idaho April 17, 2013) ("the recording statutes do not require instruments to be 
recorded .... "). The Watsons are not a party to the assignment of Deed of Trust, and therefore 
lack standing to challenge the assignment. See Edwards, 154 Idaho at 516 ("Although standing 
is required to invoke the jurisdiction of a court, it is not a requirement for the nonjudicial 
foreclosure of a deed of trust. Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to restrain the foreclosure sale based 
upon MERS's alleged lack of standing" (citations omitted)); see also Vittitow v. Bank of Am., 
NA., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146441, at *9-10 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2014) ("It is a well-
established point of law that borrowers lack standing to challenge the assignment of their Deed, 
as they are non-parties to the assignment"). 
Accordingly, the fact that the December 3, 2010 assignment of the Deed of Trust from 
MERS to Bank of America contains surplus language regarding an assignment of the Note does 
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not the assignment Deed Trust it does not support causes 
action suggested in the Amended Complaint. 
B. The Watsons' New Arguments Have No Merit 
The Watsons make a number of new arguments that do not provide any basis to overturn 
the district court's decision. For example, the Watsons contend that defendants are in violation 
of the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Appellants' Brief p. 
22), but those claims are not alleged in the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, they cannot be 
asserted for the first time on appeal. 
The W atsons also contend that "Defendants have engaged in a contradictory and 
fraudulent list of Statements, Notices and Court Entries, regarding the identity of the true Entity, 
to whom the Plaintiffs owed the debt to." (Appellants' Brief at p. 14). According to the 
Watsons these acts increased the risk that the Watsons would receive claims that the Watsons 
owe two or more different entities for the same debt. (Id.) However, there are no allegations 
related to this claim in the Amended Complaint and these new claims do not relate to any of the 
causes of action the Watsons attempted to allege in the Amended Complaint. 
The Watsons suggest that defendants have failed to prove any right to foreclose because 
they have not produced a "blue ink signed original Note .... " (Appellants' Brief at p. 17). The 
Watsons made no allegations concerning this theory in the Amended Complaint. Even if the 
Watsons had preserved this argument for appeal, it has already been rejected by this Court. In 
Trotter v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon, this Court held that "pursuant to LC. § 45-1505, a trustee may 
initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on a deed of trust without first proving ownership of 
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note or that trust beneficiary or 
authorized the trustee to initiate those proceedings." Trotter, 152 Idaho 842,847 (Idaho 2012); 
see also Mortensen v. A1ortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140933, *35-
*36 (D. Idaho Aug. 24, 2012) (holding that under Trotter, there is no requirement that the trustee 
produce the original "wet-ink" note and deed of trust to undertake a non-judicial foreclosure). 
Finally, the Watsons suggest that the foreclosure cannot proceed until a determination is 
made as "to whom the debt is owed," presumably referring to who owns the Watsons' loan. 
(See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at p. 22). This Court has already rejected this argument, holding that 
"a trustee may initiate non-judicial foreclosure proceedings on a deed of trust without proving 
ownership of the underlying note .... " Trotter, 152 Idaho 847. Accordingly there is no 
requirement for the district court to determine who owns the Watsons' loan. As the Idaho 
district court has stated, "the borrower (the maker of the note) 'should be indifferent as to who 
owns or has an interest in the note so long as it does not affect the maker's ability to make 
payments on the note."' Cherian v. Countywide Home Loans, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
166834, *8 (D. Idaho Nov. 20, 2012) (quoting Veal v. Am. Home Mortgaging Serv., Inc., 450 
B.R. 897, 912 (9th Cir. BAP 2011)). 
VI. MERS, FANNIE MAE, AND GREEN TREE JOIN THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY 
BANK OF AMERICA, GREENPOINT, AND RECONTRUST 
The gravamen of the Amended Complaint are the allegations that the Watsons agreed to a 
loan modification with Bank of America. (R.52-53 at iJiJ23-31 ). From these allegations, the 
Watsons appear to seek damages for breach of contract, declaratory relief, and breach of the 
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covenant of good dealing. R.55). These allegations do not appear to 
be addressed to MERS, Fannie Mae, or Green Tree. However, to the extent these allegations can 
be construed against these defendants, MERS, Fannie Mae and Green Tree expressly join and 
incorporate herein the arguments made by Respondents Bank of America, Greenpoint, and 
ReconTrust. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the district court's decision below should be affirmed in all 
respects. 
Dated: April 27, 2016 
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